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Introduction
Most economists agree that countercyclical monetary policies are useful to stabilize the general price level and thereby smooth business cycles. During a downturn, monetary policy has to lower interest rates to prevent deflation and deep crisis. In a boom period, interest rates have to be raised to prevent inflation and an overheating economy. In practice, however, major central banks seem to have reacted stronger in times of crisis than in boom periods since the late 1980s (Schnabl and Hoffmann, 2008) .
For instance, the Bank of Japan (BoJ) has not increased interest rates during the upswing in 1995-96. In contrast, with the event of the Asian crisis in 1997-98, the BoJ cut interest rates decisively to zero. In the US and Europe, a similar policy was seen after the burst of the dot-com bubble in 2000. While the downturn justified sharp interest rate cuts to stabilize prices and output, interest rates were held relatively low in the post-crisis period, even though the economies boomed again (Schnabl and Hoffmann, 2008; Taylor, 2009 ).
This provided low-cost liquidity to flourishing asset markets which eventually contributed to new bubbles in the US housing market, South and Eastern Europe, and East Asia. And yet again, in the wake of the financial crisis of 2007-09 major central banks slashed interest rates. Because the initial interest rate level was still relatively low, interest rates fell close to zero (Schnabl and Hoffmann, 2008; Taylor, 2009; and Belke et al., 2010) . To provide an explanation for this interest rate setting behavior, this paper analyzes the role of asset markets in Federal Reserve (Fed) and European Central Bank (ECB) policies over time.
Particularly, I want to investigate whether and why US and euro area monetary policies responded asymmetrically with respect to asset market developments. Has policy changed over time?
Previous research has estimated augmented monetary policy (Taylor) rules to answer the question of whether asset prices have an impact on US or euro area monetary policy decisions. While Rigobon and Sack (2003) and Dupor and Conley (2004) find evidence for monetary policy reactions of the Fed towards stock markets, Fuhrer and Tootell (2008) find the opposite. For the ECB, Botzen and Marey (2010) and Belke and Polleit (2006) challenge Bohl et al. (2004; in showing that the ECB adjusted interest rates following changes in the dollar/euro exchange rate and stock markets.
While these papers test for a symmetrical reaction of central banks towards asset price movements, little research focuses on asymmetric monetary policy responses with respect to asset markets. But fear of crisis when stock markets burst or exchange rates appreciate may have implications on policy. In order to close this gap, I apply the approach taken by Danne and and Hoffmann (2009) . Schnabl and Danne (2008) use threshold dummies and moving window regressions to single out effects of appreciating versus depreciating exchange rates on Japanese monetary policy. The authors find that the BoJ lowered interest rates when the yen appreciated from 1993 to 1999. In contrast, the BoJ did not raise interest rates accordingly, when the yen depreciated. Hoffmann (2009) provides first evidence of asymmetric behavior of the Fed.
This paper is organized as follows. In section 2, I explain how and why the Fed's and ECB's monetary policies may have changed over time. I present different arguments about how asset markets should be taken into account by monetary policy makers. In section 3, I
review the literature that tests whether asset markets are included in monetary policy rules. I provide first graphical evidence of my thesis that monetary policy responds asymmetrically towards asset markets in certain periods. Further, I introduce a model to test for this asymmetry. In section 4, tests are carried out to determine whether the Fed and ECB reacted asymmetrically towards positive and negative asset price developments in certain periods. I assume that a change of a big player, such as the Fed chairman, may cause a shift in policy.
Section 5 concludes.
Changes in Monetary Policy Frameworks

From Money to Inflation and Output Targeting
Monetary policy frameworks have changed over time. Traditionally central banks in advanced economies tried to achieve price stability by broad money targeting, which is based upon "the quantity theory of money" (Friedman, 1956 ). According to this theory, money growth is the ultimate source of inflation in the long run. Changes in broad money are set equal to changes in output plus inflation (under the assumption of a constant velocity of money). Therefore, Friedman (1956) proposes that broad money growth should not exceed output growth plus an agreed rate of inflation.
Building upon this concept, the Deutsche Bundesbank saw M3 growth within a corridor of 4 -6 percent as inflation neutral. Similarly, the ECB introduced a two-pillar strategy including a monetary pillar as framework for its interest rate decisions with a reference value of 4.5 percent for money growth. However, since the 1990s broad money has grown at annual rates of 10 percent in the advanced economies.
Given low inflation in the 1990s, although broad money grew rapidly, many authors question the impact of money growth on inflation. For instance, De Grauwe and Polan (2005) show that, in the short term, differences in money growth among countries cannot explain differences in their inflation rates. Further, money demand, being defined as the reciprocal of the velocity of money, is not constant over time -especially in the US. As money demand is unstable, Estrella and Mishkin (1997) , Gerlach and Svensson (2003) and Stock and Watson (1999) argue that money growth is not a good indicator to predict future inflation. Instead, they propose current inflation and output as indicators to forecast future inflation. Alesina et al. (2001) and Begg et al. (2002) find that following a monetary target can lead to restrictive policies even if inflation rates are stable. Therefore, targeting money growth has a negative impact on growth. As consumer price inflation seems to be a more reliable monetary policy target than broad money growth, these authors propose inflation targeting frameworks.
The New-Keynesian models incorporate interest rate rules to model how central banks adjust the nominal interest rate in response to changes in inflation and output (Woodford, 2003) . In this framework, monetary policy follows a Taylor rule (Taylor, 1993) . The interest rate is the main operating target to control consumer price inflation. Furthermore, output can be stimulated by lower interest rates as long as consumer price inflation is stable (without reference to money growth). Money growth is only considered via the secondary pillar of the ECB. The Fed no longer publishes any data concerning M3 growth.
Asset Markets and Monetary Policy
After the burst of the dot-com bubble, monetary policy makers cut interest rates sharply to stabilize the price level and output. While the resulting money growth did not have direct effects on good markets, it affected stock, commodity and foreign exchange markets around the world (Borio, 2008) . Because money and asset price growth often precede inflationary periods (Adalid and Detken, 2007) , this has spurred an academic discussion about the need to include asset markets in monetary policy reaction functions.
On the one hand, Filardo (2001) and Polleit (2005) argue that monetary policy shall respond towards asset markets if they contain information on future inflation or output. This shall help prevent the emergence of asset market bubbles. Also, Johnson (2001) proposes to include further measurable (forward-looking) indicators in the monetary policy response function, for instance foreign exchange, bond and commodity market developments. To prevent future inflation and instability, this strand of literature emphasizes the need for central bank reactions in order to smooth asset market developments (e.g. Borio, 2008; Cecchetti et al., 2000) .
In contrast, Bernanke and Gertler (2001) argue that there is no need to take asset markets into account as they are already considered indirectly via the output and inflation channel. Blinder and Reis (2005) further explain that the Fed should not intervene when asset market developments are friendly for the economic performance because it is uncertain whether asset markets reflect fundamentals or not. Furthermore, pricking e.g. a stock market bubble may cause instability. Accordingly, monetary policy should only react towards the stock market when a bubble bursts to prevent a crisis. Otherwise, it should remain passive (Blinder and Reis, 2005, p. 67) .
Similarly, Mishkin (2007, p. 40) argues that preventing asset market bubbles is not the task of a central bank. However, monetary authorities should respond quickly after a bubble has burst to stabilize the economy and prevent a possible crisis. As American central bankers widely agree on this issue, this position is known as Jackson Hole Consensus. By proposing interest rate cuts when bubbles burst, but not wanting interest rates to rise in boom periods, the Jackson Hole Consensus implicitly proposes asymmetric reactions towards asset market developments. Similarly, the ECB states that "financial imbalances and asset price misalignments may need to be taken into account in current monetary policy decisions" (ECB, 2004, p. 57) .
Asymmetric Monetary Policy with Respect to Asset Markets
Previous Research and Graphical Evidence
There is a growing literature that addresses the question of whether central banks react (symmetrically) towards asset markets. For instance, Rigobon and Sack (2003) and Dupor and Conley (2004) Fuhrer and Tootell (2008) reject this hypothesis. For the ECB, Botzen and Marey (2010) and Belke and Polleit (2006) challenge Bohl et al. (2004; in showing that the ECB adjusted interest rates following changes in the euro/dollar exchange rate and stock markets. For Japanese monetary policy, the yen/dollar exchange rate played a role for interest rate decisions during the 1990s (Clarida et al., 1998) .
This essay addresses asymmetric responses of the Fed and Bundesbank / ECB with respect to asset markets. For the Bank of Japan, Danne and Schnabl (2008) find asymmetric monetary policy reactions with respect to exchange rate changes. Figure 1 provides an intuition for an impact of the foreign exchange market on interest rate decisions, in particular after the Plaza agreement (vertical line) when the US forced Japan to appreciate its currency to reduce its current account surplus (up to 1995) . Figure 1 indicates that exchange rate and interest rate changes went along from 1985 to 1995. When the yen appreciated, interest rates were cut. Whereas, when the yen depreciated, the BoJ did not raise interest rates. According to the authors, this contributed to Japan's fall into the liquidity trap.
There is also evidence for asymmetric monetary policy of the US Fed and ECB. Schnabl and Hoffmann (2008) and Hoffmann (2009) With the US Fed's expansionary policy devaluing the dollar, it is plausible that the ECB followed the Fed's policy via the exchange rate channel from 1999 to 2006 to keep the European economies competitive during this period (Belke and Polleit, 2006) . Jan-99 Jan-00 Jan-01 Jan-02 Jan-03 Jan-04 Jan-05 Jan-06 Jan-07 Jan-08 Because output growth and inflation levels remained relatively stable in the US and euro area since the 1990s, Schnabl and Hoffmann (2008) further argue that asymmetric monetary policy responses towards asset markets contributed to the downward-trend in interest rates -as it is obvious in Figure 4 -that fuelled a wave of worldwide asset market bubbles.
3 Figure 4 indicates that interest rates have a downward-trend in the three advanced economies.
The Model
To model asymmetric monetary policy decisions with respect to asset markets I use the forward-looking monetary policy reaction function as proposed by Clarida et al. (1998) .
Equation (1) Taylor (1993) , who introduced the Taylor rule, quantified E to be 1.5 and J to be 0.5 in the US.
Finally the decision depends on the natural rate of interest i , which is the interest rate where inflation target and output target are at the equilibrium level. Then, inflation and the output gaps are zero. In contrast to Taylor (1993) , the policy rule proposed by Clarida et al.
(1998) is a forward-looking rule. 4 It uses future variables for monetary policy decisions. The rational behind the use of future variables is that there is a certain time needed for inflation and output to follow interest rate decisions. Therefore, central banks have to anticipate what happens in future and follow a forward-looking rule, rather than using past developments (Bernanke, 2003) . 5 The monetary policy decisions are made under uncertainty.
Further, Clarida et al. (1998, pp. 7-8) introduce interest rate smoothing into the reaction function, as interest rate setting depends on the level of the interest rate in the past.
The economic reason behind it is that central banks do not set rates randomly as sudden interest rate adjustments shock markets and signal instability. Thus, Bohl et al. (2004) argue that forward-looking rules are more accurate in explaining monetary policy. with U being a parameter between 0 and 1. The closer U is to 1 the higher the degree of interest rate smoothing. The error term t v is assumed to be normally distributed. To eliminate the expectation parameters, Clarida et al. (1998) 
An expectation or uncertainty parameter is not needed for asset market gaps, as they are known at any time t . 1 G captures the effect of asset markets on monetary policy.
Equation (4) 
In equation (5) 2 G represents the effect of positive asset market deviations from trend on monetary policy. P is the additional effect from negative asset market deviations. Thus, if monetary policy does not react more sensitive towards negative asset market deviations from trend 0 P , and thus 1 G = 2 G .
Empirical Estimations
Data and Method
To analyze monetary policy and estimate equations (3), (4) and (5) is only used to construct the trends needed in the estimations.
The output gap and asset market gaps are calculated by subtracting the year-over-year log-differences of industrial production, stock prices and exchange rates from their trends, which is approximated by the Hodrick-Prescott filter (Bjørnland, 2005 (Arellano and Bover, 1995) . Newey West standard errors provide robust error terms. Using realized 12-month forward inflation rates in the regression to estimate equation (4) and (5) assumes that expectations of policy makers are accurate in forecasting this variable.
As widely used when estimating Taylor rules, lags of the regressors of up to twelve periods (one year) and a constant are used as instruments (Dupor and Conley, 2004; Clarida el al., 1998) . The impact of asset prices on future output and inflation is taken into account for by including asset prices as instruments (Fuhrer and Tootell, 2008; Bohl et al., 2004, p. 23 ).
Because more orthogonality conditions (instruments) than needed are used to estimate the parameters of the equations, Sargan (1958) and Hansen (1982) suggest a test for validity of instruments. All sample moments shall be close to zero. To do so, J-statistics are multiplied with the number of observations. If the respective value is smaller than the critical value of the Ȥ² -distribution, the null hypothesis of validity of instruments is not rejected.
Federal Reserve
Set-up 
Estimation results
First, I estimate a baseline regression (which corresponds to equation (3)) as a benchmark.
The results are presented in Table 1 . The first column in Table 1 indicates the time period and equation that is estimated. The following columns present the coefficients with their standard errors in parentheses. Stars mark significant coefficients as described in the Table. Standard errors in parentheses, ***,**,* denote significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels. Test for over-identifying restrictions: J-statistics multiplied by the number of observations is always smaller than Ȥ²(27 or 28). As 33 instruments are used and 5 or 6 coefficients estimated, I have 27 or 28 degrees of freedom. . Exchange rates are not considered (and would also not be significant) as the US is the center of the world monetary system which does not stabilize exchange rates (McKinnon, 2010) . 9 To decide whether the cumulated coefficient is significant, its t-statistic has to be calculated as follows. 
The first line in Table 1 reports the results for the baseline estimation (equation 3). I explain the meaning of the parameters in detail for this regression. For further specifications, I
focus on the most important insights and emphasize the differences with respect to the baseline estimation.
D is a constant and U is the coefficient on interest rate smoothing. This coefficient is close to 1 because interest rates are set dependent on the previous period as explained in section 3.2. The coefficient on inflation E is 2.11 with a standard error of 0.37. Thus, a rise in inflation by 1 percent led to an increase in real interest rates (nominal interest ratesinflation) of 1.11 percent or 111 basis points (BP) over the whole estimation period. Nominal interest rates are raised more than the rise in expected inflation to offset inflationary pressure.
This result is statistically significant.
The coefficient on the output gap J is significant, too. Given expected inflation is constant, a 1 percent rise in the output gap brings about a 0.71 percent rise in (real and nominal) interest rates (holding inflation constant). Both coefficients are very close to the findings by Clarida et al. (2008) as well as the suggested coefficients by the seminal Taylor rule (Taylor, 1993) . Thus, the Taylor rule seems to be a valuable tool to model monetary policy of the Fed.
Next, I estimate equation (4) Stock markets pushed interest rates downwards.
To test for asymmetric behavior with respect to the stock market, I add the asymmetric term P to estimate equation (5). Entries 5 -8 of Table 1 show the results for the estimation including the asymmetric term. The coefficients on inflation and output gap remain at widely unchanged levels. The coefficient on the stock market gap is now labeled 2 G . Like before, the stock market coefficient is not significant in the overall sample and the Volcker period.
However, the results for the Greenspan-Bernanke period indicate that stock markets affect US interest rates negatively.
The asymmetric term P is the additional effect that stems from negative stock market gaps, while 2 G is the effect positive stock market gaps have on the interest rate. Thus, to calculate the total effect of a negative stock market gap on interest rate setting, 2 G and P have to be added. In the Greenspan period, which can be found in line 7 of Table 1 the joint effect is positive. Also, the joint t-statistic for below trend stock market developments is positive and significant at the five percent level. Therefore, the estimation of equation (5) indicates that stock market busts had a significant negative effect on the Fed's policy. When stock prices fell, the Fed lowered interest rates.
Further, Alan Greenspan did not raise interest rates when stock markets boomed.
Otherwise, the general effect 2 G would be positive, too. The negative coefficient is driven by the post 2002 period -as is in line with Figure 2 . Thus, the Fed reacted asymmetrically with respect to the stock market since the late eighties. 10 This put a downward pressure on the interest rate.
To summarize, Table 1 indicates that the impact of stock prices on monetary policy decisions was weak during the Volcker era, but increased when Greenspan came to power.
Because significance of the stock market gaps depends on the time period taken into account, this may be a reason why some authors find a response with respect to asset markets and others do not.
Rolling window
Rolling window regressions can help identify changes in asymmetric monetary policy with respect to the stock market. I estimate equation (5) 10 To decide whether the cumulated coefficient is significant, its t-statistic has to be calculated. When 1990-91 data enters the regression, the t-statistics reaches levels of significance for a short period (1980 -1990 up to 1982 -1992) . This is when the Japanese crisis as well as the US stock market crash of 1987 is included in the estimation period. Then again, busts turns out to be significant from 2003 onwards. For the estimation period starting in January 1993 (going up to January 2003), t-statistics stay above the five-percent significance levels.
The t-statistic suggests that the Fed lowered interest rates with respect to a negative stock market gap.
To summarize, the findings indicate that the Fed has cut interest rates in response to stock market busts when Greenspan was in office. Whereas, when stock markets recovered after 2003, the Fed has not increased interest rates, given constant inflation and output gaps (therefore the negative sign). Following Aladid and Detken (2007) and Greiber and Setzer (2007) the Fed may have held interest rates low while asset markets (instead of consumer prices) absorbed additional liquidity. With inflation not picking up, the Fed tried to fuel growth and consumption via loose monetary policy. In line with the Jackson Hole Consensus, monetary policy has not tried to prick bubbles but only reacted when a crisis was possible.
Given that the Fed responded towards falling stock prices, this asymmetric behavior put a downward pressure on interest rates.
ECB (and Bundesbank)
Set-up
The analysis for the ECB (and Bundesbank) takes into account data from March 1979 to December 2009. In March 1979, the Bundesbank started to reign in inflation. Therefore, the Taylor rule may be applicable to analyze monetary policy (Clarida et al., 1998) . To estimate equations (4) and (5), I consider two asset market variables. These are exchange rates and stock prices. Like for the Fed, I distinguish between three different periods. First, I use the full sample. Then, I estimate the equations separately for the Deutsche Bundesbank and ECB to find evidence of policy changes due to the new institutional environment. I include M3 growth as additional instrumental variable in the regressions. This is consistent with the monetary strategy of the ECB, in which money growth is (officially) monitored to control inflation.
Estimation results
Like for the Fed, I begin with estimating a baseline regression without any asset market variable. The results can be found in entry 1 of Table 2 . The coefficients on inflation E and output gap J are positive and significant at the commonly used levels. Interestingly, they are at the same levels as for the Fed. Thus, German / European monetary policy was on average similar to that of the Fed, and applying a Taylor rule is sensible.
A rise in inflation by 1 percent led to an increase in real interest rates of 1.29 percent or 129 BP in the baseline specification. This result is statistically significant. The coefficient on the output gap J is 1.09. The result reconfirms Botzen and Marey (2010) , Belke and Polleit (2006) and Bohl et al. (2008) in finding that German / euro area policy rules include an output gap and inflation.
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Next, I estimate equations (4) with the exchange rate gap as asset market variable for the three different periods. The coefficients on inflation and output are robust with respect to the baseline specification. In the sub-periods, they are closer to the findings in earlier literature and near to the levels suggested by Taylor's rule (1993) for the Fed.
In the further explanation, I shall focus mainly on the impact of the exchange rate gap.
Entries 2 -4 indicate that exchange rate gap 1 G played a role in monetary policy of the ECB but not of the Bundesbank. Therefore, there is no significant effect of exchange rate gaps on interest rate setting, when using the full sample. But the estimation for the period from 1999 to 2008 signals a positive significant impact of the exchange rate gap on ECB monetary policy. Standard errors in parentheses, ***,**,* denote significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels. Test for over-identifying restrictions: J-statistics multiplied by the number of observations was always smaller than Ȥ²(33 or 34). As M3 growth was added to the instrument list, I have 39 instruments and 5 or 6 coefficients. Thus, there are 33 to 34 degrees of freedom.
Thus, the ECB lowered interest rates when exchange rates appreciated above trend. On the other hand, when they depreciated, interest rates were raised. My findings confirm those of Botzen and Marey (2010) and Belke and Polleit (2006) , using more data and monthly frequencies. Given previous research, this result seems to be robust. However, since the coefficients in each study vary, I cautiously do not interpret the size of the coefficients.
12 The cumulated effect is not significant. The joint t-statistic is too small. Thus, there is no effect. 
Estimating equation (5) I do not find evidence for asymmetric responses towards exchange rate changes for the ECB / Bundesbank. Hence, entries 5 -7 provide no further insights but only confirm the results from estimating equation (4). Using the stock market gaps as opposed to the exchange rate gaps (entries 8 -13) does not provide any further insights either. I find no significant coefficients. Instead, adding the stock market gap seems to affect the coefficients on inflation and output and make the regressions less stable.
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Rolling window
Since the estimation of equation (5) (4) analog to that of the Fed is used to collect data to draw a graph of the rolling window t-statistics for the exchange rate gap. 13 But adding them as instrument seems to provide more stable results -as suggested by Bohl et al. (2004) . there is no period that solely includes the ECB. While levels of significance of the exchange rate gap rise to the end of the sample again, there is no data to robustly estimate rolling window t-statistics for different periods during the time the ECB was in charge of monetary policy.
To summarize the findings for the ECB and Bundesbank, the estimation of equation (4) suggests that the ECB pursued monetary policy with respect to the exchange rate gap.
Therefore, the ECB can be argued to have indirectly followed the asymmetric intervention pattern of the Fed after the burst of the dot-com bubble. However, the graphical intuition in Table   2 ). But the moving window analysis suggests that after 1986, the exchange rate gap played a role -probably during the reunification boom and break up of the EMS.
Policy Implications
In this essay, I have tested for monetary policy responses with respect to asset markets in the US and the euro area or Germany, respectively. Although the estimations provide evidence of multiple monetary policy goals in the two major economies as suggested in section 2, asymmetric monetary policy could only be found for the Fed.
The estimation results suggest that the Fed lowered interest rates, when as it was in fear of crisis when stock markets burst, but did not raise them when they boomed since the Greenspan era. In specific, the Fed reacted asymmetrically with respect to the stock market after the dot-com bubble when interest rates were not raised in accordance with the recovery. 
